just.

Report on Ahmed Zaoui

By Ant | Jul 29, 2003

By Dr Abbas Aroua : Tuesday 1st July 2003

Introduction

I am aware that Mr Zaoui is in New Zealand seeking asylum and that he has been issued with a National Security Risk Certificate. Based on my dealings with him and my own research and contacts, I have the following comments to make concerning Mr Zaoui in relation to these matters. I have covered areas at Mr Zaoui’s counsel’s request. I believe I am qualified to do so based on my qualifications and prior dealings with Mr Zaoui.
I am a medical and health physicist and director of Aroua Health & Education Corporation, Switzerland. My credentials are as follows:

Director of the Hoggar Institute for human rights studies, focusing on North African countries, Geneva 1994

Participant at the Sant’Egidio meetings on the Algerian crisis (Rome, November 1994 and January 1995)

Founding member of Rehab organization for the rehabilitation of the survivors of torture, Lausanne 1995

Founder of the Movement for Truth, Justice and Peace in Algeria, 1998

Founding member of Justitia Universalis organisation against impunity, The Hague 2001

Member of the Board of Directors of the Centre for Historical Research on Algeria, Geneva 2002

Secretary of the Board of Trustees of the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva for dialogue of cultures and peace studies, Geneva 2002

Spokesperson of the International Bureau of Humanitarian NGOs, Paris 2003

Ahmed’s Zaoui’s role

I met with Mr. Ahmed Zaoui several times during a decade of human rights activities. He was introduced to me, by a colleague, as a former lecturer at the Institute of Islamic Studies at the University of Algiers, as a member of the Consultative Council of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and as a parliamentary candidate in the 1991 general elections in Algeria.
In the framework of our research activity at the Hoggar Institute I had many discussions and a regular written exchange with him, particularly after the Sant’Egidio meetings of the main Algerian opposition parties, held in Rome in November 1994 and January 1995, which he supported strongly.
Obviously, when we were preparing An Inquiry into the Algerian Massacres, a 1500-page investigation published by our Institute in 2000, we contacted Mr. Zaoui, who was then head of the Coordination Council of FIS abroad (CCFIS), to make inquiries about the nature of the Armed Islamic Group known as the GIA (the French acronym), to check claims about his alleged role within this organization, and to probe a few hypotheses about the relation of the latter with the FIS. His answer to our questions was that he had absolutely no link whatsoever with this organization (the GIA) and he informed us that he was himself sentenced to death by this armed group.
A two-year research on the GIA was concluded by the publication of a paper in English entitled “What is GIA?” by B. Izel, J.S. Wafa, and W. Isaac, which presented the arguments in support of the view that the GIA is a counter-guerrilla organization fielded by military intelligence. It was shown that the GIA embodies the identifying institutional attributes typical of a counter-guerrilla organization: i) irregularity attribute, ii) the compositional profile condition (especially command-and-control positions held by infiltrated military intelligence agents), and iii) the anti-insurgent operational attributes typical of a counter-guerrilla force). A second justification of the counter-guerrilla hypothesis focused on the functional identity of the GIA. The GIA was shown to operate in violation of all the strategic principles of guerrilla warfare, and in accordance with those of counter-insurgency warfare.
This thesis later received strong confirmation from soldiers, officers and two very high commanding officers (colonel Samraoui and colonel Benali) who deserted the army and military intelligence units, and either published memoirs and articles, or testified in documentary films shown for instance on Al Jazeera satellive TV and the French TV station Canal +, or gave witness accounts during the court case of general Khaled Nezzar against Lieutenant Souaidia for libel in Paris in July 2002.
In Algeria, the criminal acts of the GIA extended from individual assassinations to collective massacres of civilians, all of which served the strategy of the military junta, whose main concern was to deprive the FIS from the vital support of the population. Similarly, the terrorist acts perpetrated outside Algeria were the best way to criminalize the FIS and to isolate it at the international level. The Algerian military regime’s propaganda always sought, and seeks still, to associate the GIA with the FIS.
On the basis of our extensive and detailed research experience in Algeria’s political violence and human rights abuses, and given the statements I collected from M. Zaoui and from all of the information I have gathered about him and his communiqués as head of the CCFIS, I give no credence to the claims that he had been a member of the GIA, and I regard claims about possible links between him, a senior representative of the FIS, and the GIA as false and, as discussed below, contrived by the very regime seeking his elimination.
The Algerian Military Regime and Mr Zaoui
I believe that in the 1990s the Algerian regime viewed Mr. Zaoui as a significant political threat who had to be neutralized or eliminated. This explains why he was one of the main targets outside Algeria of both the Algerian diplomacy, in the service of the military regime, and the GIA which I regard as a counter-guerrilla organization infiltrated and commanded by military intelligence.
I should however add that the regime, though dominated by the advocates of the eradication of the political opposition (the self-styled ‘eradicationists’), should not be regarded as monolithic. There is actually a small faction within it that always sought a negotiated settlement. It is worth mentioning in this regard that, to my knowledge, one of the wings of the Algerian pouvoir, particularly President Bouteflika, approached Mr. Zaoui in 1999 in order to launch some sort of preliminary negotiations with the FIS. However, I am not aware if any progress was registered during these discussions, knowing that the ‘eradicationists’ who control the military institution are strongly opposed to any form of contact with the FIS.
The military regime regards Mr. Zaoui as a big threat outside Algeria, because he is a popular and influential figure. This is the reason he was elected to his parliamentary seat. His family background (son of a charismatic Islamic scholar respected throughout the country and even by the highest authorities), his specialized knowledge of religion and track-record of honesty and service to citizens have all contributed to making him a political figure people listened to and widely respected by a wide cross-section of the population. Moreover, there is the fact that President Bouteflika himself sought to consult Mr Zaoui which is further evidence of his political weight, his credibility and the public legitimacy which he holds.
The military regime, sure as it is of its huge and disproportionate military advantage, has always sought to have armed and fanatical zealots as opponents, since such fearful but politically harmless bogeymen serve only to legitimize their putsch, their widespread human rights abuses and their continued control of the country and its wealth. As soon as the putschist generals have in front of them an astute opponent who chooses to confront them in the political arena where they are naked and vulnerable, rather than in the military field where they are superior, they panic.
Mr Zaoui is precisely that danger because he chose the political line of confrontation, because he opposes them with the tactics of rationality rather than the emotionalism of zealots, because he uses the language of moderation rather than the rants of fanaticism. The Algerian generals of the ‘eradicationist’ type feel comfortable with the armed zealots who legitimize their rule, and provide the regime its justification for the violations of liberties and abuses of rights under the guise of the politics of ‘counter-terrorism’. The generals however regard as dangerous all those, who like Mr Zaoui, pursue the politics of peace, non-violence and negotiation. The problem is that the ‘eradicationist’ generals have perpetrated so many human rights abuses, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, besides the corruption charges that stand against them, that they have no hope or interest in the country returning to an era of peace where truth is bound to come out.
Media reports emanating from Algeria
In my view, to talk about free independent press in Algeria after the January 1992 coup is merely an illusion. Anyone who studies seriously this press will come to the conclusion that the main newspapers, in particular those published in French, are owned or fully controlled by the various conflicting groups within the hierarchy of the Algerian army. In the Algerian street it is commonly said: “Tell me for which newspaper you work and I will tell you to which clan of generals you are affiliated”.
At a more academic level, Professor Hadi Chalabi, an eminent Algerian jurist living in France, published in 1999 a study entitled The Algerian Press beyond any Suspicion (La presse algérienne au-dessus de tout soupçon, Ina-Yas 1999) where he deconstructed with strong evidence the myth of “Free and independent Press in Algeria”. In a public presentation of his book in Geneva in June 2000, fully reproduced in an attached file, Prof. Chalabi stated (pages 1-2):
“I endeavored to demonstrate in The Algerian Press beyond any Suspicion what hide the most famous French titles of the Algerian press. The choice of these titles (El Watan, Liberté, Le Matin, La Tribune) was imposed for another reason: these titles are credited, in Europe and in France in particular, of all the qualities of reference newspapers, representing the hope for democracy and freedom. These daily journals that define themselves as independent, have provided hundreds of associations, political parties and thousands of individuals, men and women, with a reading grid of the Algerian events of the 1990s, by reworking the colonial history of Algeria and that of the war of independence. The Algerian press in its main components was nothing and is still nothing than a strategic element in the shaping of the political currents in favor of the policy deliberately established by the military oligarchy as expressed by an occult council or a generals’ diwan (cabinet). The aim of the policy is limited to prohibit any access to freedom and democracy. The autonomy of the Algerian press is nothing than a deceit hiding and denying the political realities.”
In order to better understand the media functioning in Algeria please refer to the attached papers: “The Media Commandos in Algeria” by I. Latif and “Counterinsurgency (COIN) propaganda” by Y. Bedjaoui.
Criminal charges and convictions against Mr Zaoui in Algeria
I cannot comment on the precise criminal charges Mr Zaoui faces in Algeria, but I can give my view on the judicial system that has been governing Algeria since 1992. In a few words I can qualify this system as another instrument controlled and used by the Algerian Junta in the repression of all forms of political opposition.
Maître Abdennour Ali-Yahia, the president of the Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights (LADDH – French acronym), in his introduction to An Inquiry into the Algerian Massacres (pages 11-12), wrote the following on the Algerian judicial system:
“Justice is a power according to the constitution. It is in fact the instrument of le pouvoir. The interference of le pouvoir in judicial affairs and the temptation to influence judicial decisions are the rule. Where there are no independent magistrates, there are only delegates of the authorities. In past political trials, the magistrates did not rule in conformity with the law and their conscience, but in accordance with the instructions given by le pouvoir, the justice minister and the security services involved. Justice does not control the police which has overpowered it: the judiciary only continues the work of the police the way the latter has indicated.

What the judges are required to know about a defendant is what he is, not what he has done. This is the time of fabricated trials, which are grotesquely reminiscent of the Moscow trials of 1936-1938, those of the Algerian war, and of the dissolved state security court and the special courts. According to Vichinsky’s theory, the perfect proof is the defendant’s own confession, obtained under torture — the charge being already a pre-sentence judgment that precedes the actual sentence. Under a state of emergency, asking for a fair trial in political matters is — as the political expression goes — tantamount to getting blood out of a stone.

Judicial crimes have been committed. Innocent people have been given severe sentences, while others have been sentenced to death and executed. This will remain an indelible stain on justice. Some magistrates will go down in history as butchers, not as judges.

Political asylum is flouted everywhere; it is in danger everywhere, especially in Europe where it is interpreted in an increasingly restrictive way through the adoption of repressive and deterring measures which contradict internal and international laws. To send back to Algeria political refugees, whose residence is not legal and who had fled their country to escape a ferocious repression, is tantamount to being accessory to the fate awaiting them on their arrival: torture and sometimes death.”

Maître Vergès, a well known Parisian lawyer, in his Open Letter to Algerian Friends Turned Torturers (Lettre ouverte à des amis devenus tortionnaires, Albin Michel 1993, find attached the text of the English version that will be published soon) compared the special courts established in Algeria right after the 1992 coup with sections spéciales set up by the Vichy government during World War 2. After explaining the conditions of the trials in such special courts, he concluded that “it is now up to the European governments to speak out and say whether they agree to extradite men condemned to capital punishment in these circumstances.”

French file
It seems that all of the criminal charges against Mr. Zaoui in France were built on a dossier fabricated jointly by Algerian military intelligence, formally known as the Intelligence and Security Directorate (Direction de Renseignement et Sécurité – DRS) and their French counterpart. At that time, Charles Pasqua was Minister of Home affairs and the Algerian and French services were collaborating very closely.
It is noteworthy that the French lobby that seemed to be behind the campaign against Mr. Zaoui could not even convince the French judiciary to seek his extradition, as the case against him (the dossier) was rather dubious and poor in evidence.
New Zealand national security

I understand that following the outcome of Mr Zaoui’s refugee appeal, there will be a further review of the question of whether he might constitute a threat to New Zealand’s national security. On this subject, I have a number of points to make, as follows:
Given the distance between New Zealand and Algeria, it would in my view be extremely unlikely that Mr Zaoui might be at risk in New Zealand of harm at the hands of either the Algerian regime or the GIA. The Algerian regime really does not have the means to be able to do anything to harm Mr Zaoui over such an enormous distance. Even official Algerian channels such as an embassy or a consulate do not exist in New Zealand, and the closest such channel would have to be the Ambassador in Indonesia. This is to be contrasted with the situation in Europe, especially France, where the regime is very well implanted diplomatically and otherwise. Clearly in a country such as France the risk to a person such as Mr Zaoui would be far more real.

I would make the additional point that the Algerian regime would hardly be prepared to act in a country such as New Zealand because of the fact that in recent years they have become more careful about their image outside the country. They are far less likely now to consider actions such as their operation in Paris in 1995 for example, in which they assassinated cheikh Abdelbaki Sahraoui, a founding member of the FIS. This was at a time when the regime felt threatened and weakened, but we are not now in that same historical era and things are more or less easier for the regime with Bouteflika in power. As such, the regime is working far harder on projecting a good image. In relation to a country such as New Zealand affording Zaoui refugee protection, the regime might try to protest using normal diplomatic channels but that in my view would be as far as any actions in respect of him would go.

The same would apply to the risk to Mr Zaoui at the hands of an armed group such as the GIA. In the light of my observations above, the GIA would in my view not act without the approval of the Algerian regime, and so if there is a political decision not to act outside the country, this would in my view be the position of the GIA as well.

I am not aware of what Mr Zaoui plans to do in New Zealand if he was to be granted asylum and permitted to remain there. If he was to become politically active once again, such activities would in my view hardly constitute a “threat” to New Zealand’s national security in any way – politically, diplomatically or even economically. European countries such as Great Britain, France and Belgium have for many years been host to a variety of political parties from other countries who are in exile. Such parties tend to be very active and have never posed any problem.

I should also add that things have been changing very rapidly during the past 3-4 years concerning the FIS and its image. In the mid-nineties, people in Europe were very confused and did not really understand the clear delineation between the FIS and the GIA or the relationships between the different groups. But since 1997-1998, things are becoming clearer for many as people now understand more easily the various connections and delineations between the Algerian political parties, the military regime and the various armed groups.

I have also observed a real change in the attitude of many European Governments towards the FIS. Several European countries are host to members of the new National Executive Bureau of the FIS: UK is host to Mr. Mohamed L. Chouchan and Dr. Abdelhamid Fenghour, Belgium is host to Mr. Abdelhamid Ali-Ammar and Mr. Brahim Filali, and Switzerland is host to Dr. Mourad Dhina and Mr. Mohamed M. Habès. The USA is also host to Mr. Anouar N. Haddam who is member of the FIS National Executive Bureau as well. Germany too is host to the sons of Dr. Madani Abbassi who is the founding leader of the FIS.

In my observation, western governments in general are changing in their attitudes towards the FIS, understanding that the FIS is a real and legitimate political force in Algeria and realizing that they must deal with it. In this sense, the demonisation that the FIS fell victim to at the hands of the Algerian regime during the nineties has abated somewhat, and there is growing emergence of acceptance of the FIS as a legitimate political force. I doubt therefore that western governments would act adversely or wish to exert pressure on a country such as New Zealand in the case of a respected and prominent FIS leader, and in fact I would expect they might well be glad that the Zaoui dossier has finally been accepted.

I would also venture to suggest that if New Zealand national interests are a subject of debate in the Zaoui case, then in the medium and long-term the interests of New Zealand people ought to lie with the FIS and with its leaders such as Mr Zaoui, rather than with the Algerian military regime – a junta that in my view is bound to disappear eventually. If governments are wishing to build strong, durable relations with Algeria, then they will need to build these on strong foundations. The only way that this will likely to be achieved is for foreign governments to act on the side of legality and legitimacy in Algeria. To this end, the FIS and its leaders such as Mr Zaoui are the real political force in Algeria and the future in that country in my view belongs to them.

Mr Zaoui in my opinion would also have much to offer the New Zealand community in a positive, constructive manner. First, at the Algerian level, he could well be the starting point for the development of real relations and understanding between New Zealand and Algerian people. There is a great deal of mutual benefit to be attained between the countries as we do have huge complimentary resources in both countries. Second, I knew Mr Zaoui well from my talks and exchanges with him. A Professor of Comparative Religious studies, I have observed first-hand his very moderate and constructive view of the Muslim religion, and have little doubt that a man of his caliber can be a very positive force in the discourse both within the Islamic community in New Zealand and in the evolution of understanding between different faiths in that country. Mr Zaoui believes very firmly in dialogue between religions and cultures, and I believe his reasoned approach is the best approach to adopt in order to face the various strands of extremism on all sides. An individual of his intellectual level, school of thought and openness of mind would in my view prove enormously useful in nurturing an open, modern and progressive Islam in New Zealand. In this way, his presence in NZ could only work for the benefit of the country.

Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to quote a Swiss journalist who knew Mr. Zaoui when he was in Switzerland and who is willing to assist the appropriate New Zealand parties as appropriate or necessary. This quotation was sent to me by e-mail.

“From all the conversations I had with Mr. Zaoui during my meetings with him, I have not felt anything else than an exemplary moderation and discretion, and I never had the impression to be in front of an extremist. Mr. Zaoui had his own political line, but never mentioned using violence to defend this cause. On the contrary, he always condemned violence, and at a personal level I noticed a remarkable devotedness of Mr. Zaoui to his family.”

(Antoine Gessler, Journalist, International Politics, Le Nouvelliste Newspaper, Sion, Switzerland)

I would agree with these comments of Mr. Gessler. Based on my own personal observations of Mr. Zaoui I would add that I was impressed by the attachment of such a political figure to sport and to football in particular. I was also most impressed by the degree of optimism he shows concerning the resolution of the Algerian conflict, and also by his remarkable sense of humor.

Dr Abbas Aroua
July 2003

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